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Abstract: 
Despite the problematic political positions he adopted during his life span, the work of Carl Schmitt contains a 
fascinating argument in favour of ‘the political’, which is understood as a plural symbolic space composed of 
friends and enemies who reciprocally recognise each other. Schmitt’s struggle for the political is a struggle for a 
public spirit which accounts for this plurality. One of the terrains on which Schmitt wages this struggle is that 
of historical meaning. The image of history is crucial for the political, as it is one level on which the relation 
between enemies is symbolised. In this paper, Schmitt’s polemic for a political conception of history, which 
gives the enemy and the defeated their due place as political subjects, will be reconstructed. Central to Schmitt’s 
endeavour is the attempt to think historical singularity, against the notion of repetition in history, against the 
understanding of history as a reservoir of ‘lessons’ and against ideologies of progress. Through his polemic, a 
profane and sober image of history appears which stresses singularity, relative contingency and openness, and 
the pluralisation of social temporalities. The enigmatic notion of the katechon will play a crucial role in 
providing a very minimal but crucial form of historical meaning for such a political conception of history.  
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Introduction 
 
Central to Schmitt’s work is a recurrent polemic in favor of ‘the political’. Not only his book 
on the concept of the political, but also most of his other texts can be read as an argument 
against depoliticisation. Of course, throughout his life span he took concrete political 
positions, which were often very problematic, such as his advocacy for plebiscitary 
presidency under the Weimar Republic or his alliance with the Nazis. What makes his 
theoretical production interesting, however, is not the concrete struggles Schmitt waged 
against definite enemies, but his defense of the political as such.  
Although they were always also interventions in a concrete political conjuncture, 
Schmitt’s main books of the twenties, but also some of his later works, are philosophically 
located on a metalevel: they are philosophical struggles against certain ways of thinking or 
“types of spirit”, as Schmitt called them1, which threaten to undermine the political. ‘The 
political’ entails a certain spirit, or, as one would say nowadays, a ‘symbolic order’, 
structuring the relations and institutions between inimical (groups of) human beings and 
governing their self-understanding. In Political Theology or in Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form, for example, Schmitt polemicised against economic and technical ways of thinking, 
which depoliticise human relations. In the Concept of the Political, but also in other works, he 
mainly criticised ways of thinking which threaten to intensify the political relation between 
friend and enemy to such an extent as to take it “beyond the political” (über das Politische 
hinausgehend)2. Schmitt’s philosophical strategy thus consists of the attempt to find a way of 
                                                 
1 C. Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), 11. 
2 The English translation “transcending the limits of the political framework” (C. Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 36) does not have the strong and concise meaning as the 
original German “über das Politische hinausgehend” (C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1991), 37). 
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thinking or ‘spirit’ which is genuinely political, through polemic with depoliticising and 
‘hyperpoliticising’ ways of thinking, thus finding a middle ground between these extremes. 
The political denotes the “degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or 
dissociation.”3 This intensity is produced symbolically, through the way the enemy is morally 
or spiritually “put into question.”4 The political is then situated on a scale of increasing 
intensity between a pre-political level, on which the social relation is not yet interpreted as a 
friend/enemy opposition, and a hyperpolitical level where the antagonism is intensified to 
such a degree that the enemy is being moralised5 or theologised6. 
As a result of this metapolitical fight, a rather formal way of thinking ‘the political’ 
appears. Several authors have underlined this formal and even nihilistic aspect of Schmitt’s 
thinking of the political7. However, people who accuse Schmitt of nihilism often remain 
blind for the fact that ‘the political’ for Schmitt is something worth fighting for, that its loss 
through de- or hyperpoliticisation would be dangerous. In this sense, his work has some 
similarities to Arendt’s. My contention is that, precisely because of its formal nature, 
Schmitt’s philosophical position about the political can be upheld without endorsing the 
concrete and often very problematic political stances Schmitt adopted during his lifetime. 
His defense of the political is situated on a metapolitical or metaphilosophical level of the 
                                                 
3 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 26.  
4 C. Schmitt, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West. Bemerkungen zu 
Ernst Jüngers Schrift: ‘Der Gordische Knoten’,” in C. Schmitt, Staat, Grossraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 
1916-1969 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 533. 
5 C. Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1991), 190; C. 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 36; C. Schmitt, “Theory of the partisan”, CR: The New Centennial Review 4, 3 
(2004), 67.  
6 C. Schmitt, Ex captivitate salus. Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47 (Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 89 ; C. 
Schmitt, “Theory of the Partisan”, 66 ; C. Schmitt, Glossarium, 190; Jakob Taubes, En divergent accord. A propos de 
Carl Schmitt (Paris : Payot et Rivages, 2003), 25. 
7 E.g. Karl Löwith, “The occasional decisionism of C. Schmitt,” in R. Wolin (ed.), Martin Heidegger and European 
Nihilism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 150; John McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism. 
Against politics as technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 112; Reinhart Kosseleck, Le futur 
passé. Contribution à la sémantique des temps historiques (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences 
Sociales, 1990), 226-227; Marcus Llanque & Herfried Münkler, “‘Vorwort’ von 1963,” in R. Mehring (ed.), Der 
Begriff des politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), 14. 
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struggle around the spiritual or symbolic ordering of political relations, which can be studied 
and endorsed apart from Schmitt’s concrete political stances. Elsewhere I have argued that 
Schmitt makes two clearly distinguishable conceptual moves: first, he wages a metapolitical 
struggle for ‘the political,’ and only in a second move, he attempts to ‘place’ or ‘territorialise’ 
the political plurality in a particular way.8 This ‘territorialisation’ results in a particular 
distribution of politicisations and depoliticisations which misrecognises particular political 
subjects (particular enemies). Concretely, Schmitt wanted to territorialise the political in such 
a way as to enable the state to monopolise the political decision again, and to make sure 
society would be completely depoliticised. My hypothesis is that Schmitt’s most problematic 
conceptions of the strong state, sovereignty or executive power should be understood in 
terms of this spectral tension between the political and its territorialisation. 
In the framework of this article, I will limit myself to discussing Schmitt’s political-
philosophical struggle for the political on a very specific terrain, namely that of historical 
meaning. The image of history is crucial for the political, as it is one level on which the 
relation between enemies is symbolised. His approach takes an intermediate position with 
regard to the image of history: although he firmly criticises certain philosophies of histories 
(of progress for instance), history remains crucial for the political, thus necessitating an 
answer to the question of historical meaning. Indeed, for him the political is intrinsically 
historical and timely, as it is intimately related to social change.9 As history remains central, 
the process of giving meaning to it can not be evaded. And like all politically relevant 
concepts, the concept of history and the meaning attached to it cannot but be of a polemical 
                                                 
8 M. Lievens, Spectres of the Political. Uncovering the Metapolitical in Carl Schmitt, unpublished doctoral thesis, Leuven, 
2009. 
9 In stable times without social change, jurisprudence overrules politics, to the extent that one can no longer 
speak of a state in the first place but of an “unpolitical legal community” (C. Schmitt, “Legalität und 
Legitimität,” in: Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954 : Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1985), 267).  
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nature10. Giving meaning to history is thus an important battle field which Schmitt does not 
want to leave to the marxists, who were monopolising this ideological struggle.11   
In this paper, I will try to reconstruct this polemic for a political conception of 
history, showing how Schmitt particularly tried to find an image of history which gives the 
defeated their due place. Central to this is the attempt to think historical singularity, against 
the notion of repetition in history or of ‘lessons’ to be learned from it, and against ideologies 
of progress. Through his polemic, a profane and sober image of history appears which 
stresses singularity, relative contingency and openness and the pluralisation of social 
temporalities. This image is won by rejecting any thinking which threatens to turn history 
into a scientifically understood process, from which political decision has disappeared. The 
enigmatic notion of the katechon will play a crucial role in providing a very minimal but 
crucial form of historical meaning for such a political conception of history.  
 
 
Politicising history 
 
Although their substantial political positions differ greatly, Schmitt’s approach to history 
converges remarkably with Walter Benjamin’s, as far as their critique of ideologies of 
progress and their attempt to rescue the ‘defeated of history’ is concerned. Both try to think 
history as intrinsically political, contrary to dominant historical narratives which often 
obfuscate the political character of history by thinking it in terms of progress. This turns the 
image of history or historiography itself into a battle field, in which both Schmitt and 
                                                 
10 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 30-31. 
11 C. Schmitt, “Die staatsrechtliche Bedeutung der Notverordnung, insbesondere ihre Rechtsgültigkeit,” in : 
Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsatze, 261; C. Schmitt,  Donoso Cortès in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation (Cologne: Greven, 
1950).  
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Benjamin fight for a political conception of history. For both Schmitt and Benjamin, what is 
at stake in this battle is to rescue the position of the defeated of the historical process.  
“From now on, the political crowns history,” states Walter Benjamin in his 
Passagenwerk.12 However, the political understanding of history tended to get lost because of 
the dominance of ideologies of progress, which especially Stalinism and social-democracy 
upheld.13 The empty and homogenous time of progress made them blind to the necessity of 
conscious political decision and its full and broken time, based on a clear comprehension of 
history as a process of discontinuities, crises and bifurcations. It made them powerless in the 
struggle against the war and fascism, which they tended to see merely as a detour of the 
progressive course of history.  
According to Benjamin, real political action requires a break with this idea of 
progress, in favor of a ‘dialectical’ image of history, which at the same time redeems the 
downtrodden of the past through a radical decision in the present. For him, the notion of 
progress is central to the ideology of the victors. It generates an image of history as following 
its inexorable course, thus making the defeated disappear from the historical narrative, as 
their defeat must have been inevitable. On top of the defeat itself comes the ‘judgment of 
history’, history here becoming almost a subject in itself legitimising the victors’ position. 
Therefore, a redemptive way of writing history will have to rescue the defeated from 
oblivion by redefining history as intrinsically political, thus creating a space for alternative 
options put forward by a plurality of political forces.  
In this way, writing history becomes a deeply political (and metapolitical) act for 
Benjamin. The same accounts for Schmitt. “[A]ll spirit is present spirit,’ he says in his Concept 
                                                 
12 W. Benjamin, Paris Capitale du XIXe Siècle: le livres des passages  (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1989), 405. 
13 W. Benjamin, “Theses on the philosophy of history”, in Illuminations (New York : Shocken Books, 1986), 
258. 
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of the Political.14 All historical knowledge is knowledge of the present, and derives its intensity 
from the present.15 In this present, it is the victors who write history, he states in Ex 
Captivitate Salus.16 Moreover, the victor tends not only to write history, but to determine “its 
vocabulary and terminology as well.”17 
While Benjamin tries to redeem the defeated of past struggles, and to retell history 
on the basis of its “waste”18, Schmitt focuses more on the contemporary political effects of 
historical discourses. The political, understood as the relation between friends and enemies 
who recognise each other as human and political subjects, is threatened when the ideology of 
progress appears within this polemical symbolic space between enemies. Indeed, this 
ideology transforms the way the enemy or the defeated are symbolised and understood, 
potentially undermining their political subjectivity and the pluriversum of political forces 
which is constitutive of the political. In his book Ex Captivitate Salus Schmitt tells about his 
experiences of being in the position of the defeated in front of the victors’ judge, and 
suggests he can understand better than anyone this position of rightlessness:  
The suffering, which humans inflict on each other, is terrifying. We cannot simply 
turn away from it. But how will we endure its appearance ? Especially, how will a 
man (Schmitt seems to be talking about himself here, ML), for whom the knowledge 
of the law has become a part of his existence, bear the mere fact, yes the mere 
possibility of being totally outlawed, whoever undergoes it in a singular case ?19 
                                                 
14 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 62. 
15 C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 79. 
16 C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 25. 
17 C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte. Ein Beitrag zum 
Reichtsbegriff im Völkerrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 52. 
18 A. Vandevelde, “Materialisme en mystiek. De geschiedenisfilosofie van Walter Benjamin”, Denk-wijzen 2 
(1986), 77-100. 
19 C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 60.  
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Given his own political trajectory, these passages are of course very ambiguous, but they do 
enrich the view we have of Schmitt’s vision of the enemy and the defeated. The picture of 
history he gives in this text is a very sober one: many people go down, some become 
martyrs, and new generations find in suffering and need the driving force for new 
realisations: “World history is not the basis of happiness.”20 Contrary to Benjamin, Schmitt 
thinks no redemptive action is possible for the defeated of the past, except for some of them 
who are remembered as martyrs. Still, in this text more than in any other, the defeated 
enemy becomes an object of ethical consideration. Schmitt identifies himself with the naked 
human being in the face of the powerful : “Nudest is the human being, who is put undressed 
before a dressed human being, unarmed before an armed, powerless before a powerful 
one.”21 
Being himself among the defeated of world war I and especially of the ensuing treaty 
of Versailles, Schmitt has always considered his fight for political dignity of the (defeated) 
enemy as one of his central concerns. The conclusion of this war was not founded on a real 
peace treaty, but it was “a damning judgment of the victors on the defeated, who were 
marked even more as enemies afterwards, the more they were defeated.”22 In the apparently 
inexorable trend to world unity and universalism, which characterised 20th century politics, 
this ‘Vae Victis’ becomes ever more hard to bear.23  
Contrary to Benjamin, Schmitt is thus not seeking a new, redemptive form of writing 
history, but he is trying to rescue the political in the present. Images of history are very 
relevant to how the political relation is symbolically constituted. Schmitt himself underlines 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 79.  
22 C. Schmitt, “Über das Verhältnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind,”, in Positionen und Begriffe : im Kampf mit 
Weimar, Genf, Versailles 1923-1939 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), 279. 
23 C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 33. 
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how philosophies of history based on the notion of progress, produce, as all political 
discourse do, subjects: “The planning and leading elites produce themselves and the masses 
they lead with the help of historical-philosophical meanings.”24  
The symbolic production of subjects is never an innocent thing. The ideology of 
progress and its concomitant struggle for world unity have definite effects on how these are 
produced and on the relation that arises between them. According to Schmitt, the struggle 
for world unity is based on a particular historical-philosophical self-understanding.25 This 
self-understanding is constitutive of the political: “More than any other magnitude, self-
interpretation is an element of the current world situation.”26 This self-understanding in 
terms of progress has a constitutive effect on the political relation. It tends to distort the 
specifically political character of this relation by situating the enemy in a past which is already 
lost: “All mass propaganda seeks its evidence in the proof that it lies at the side of things to 
come. All mass belief is merely the belief to be situated rightly, while the opponent is 
situated falsely, as time and history and development work against him.”27 The struggle 
between the old and the new on the line of progress can never be one between two equal 
political subjects who recognise each other as such. When progress is conceived as the 
increase in technical mastery of the world, the opponent is definitively reconfigured as a 
merely technical source of disturbance, which can be easily pointed at and eliminated. In a 
technical era, the powerful think of the defeated as mere disturbers.28 The end result of this 
                                                 
24 C. Schmitt, “Drei Stufen Historischer Sinngebung,” Universitas 5 (1950), 927-931. 
25 C. Schmitt, “Die Einheit der Welt,” in: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1952), 500. 
26 Ibid. 501. 
27 C. Schmitt, Donoso Cortés in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation. Vier Aufsätze (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950), 12. 
However, technical progress as such also creates ever new enmities, which oppose old and new: “Old forms of 
enmity are merely replaced by new forms, as when in all domains of human progress the new denotes the old 
as its enemy by principle.” (Erich Vad, Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik. Perspektiven im Werk von Carl Schmitt 
(Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag, 1996), 56). 
28 C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 84. 
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process inevitably consists of a world fashioned according to the ideals of the victor. 
Schmitt’s main polemical opponent in this regard being communism, he fears its project of 
“the unity of the planet and of its submission to one sole master.”29  
As stated, the political is predicated on time and social change. When social change is 
thought in terms of progress, however, this can have de- or hyperpoliticising effects, 
especially when it is linked up with the expected advent of world unity. In his text on ‘The 
Legal World Revolution’, Schmitt states that progress is one of these empty abstractions 
which can have many meanings: “(p)rogress in the sense of accelerated scientific, technical and 
industrial development (…) can become an all-out global legitimation of opposing political 
means and ends.”30 Schmitt is not intent on criticising the modern industrial society or its 
economy, with all its environmental and health effects, as such, but to show how the notion 
of progress functions politically, how it tends to distort a genuinely political symbolic order. 
Although many different forms of progress exist, he focuses mainly on the notion of 
‘political progress,’ which refers to the parole of international parties seeking to further 
world unity in the wake of the 1917 October revolution. This process is forecasted as a 
“planetary appropriation of industry”, whose methods of conquest will be “more intensely 
aggressive and of greater destructive potential in terms of the means of power utilised.”31 
This kind of progress will not forcibly entail ethical or moral progress according to Schmitt: 
“The day world politics comes to the earth, it will be transformed into a world police power. That 
is a dubious progress!”32 A kind of hyperpolitics is its result, as the enemy inevitably becomes 
                                                 
29 C. Schmitt, “L'unité du monde (II),” in A. de Benoist (ed.) Du Politique. 'Légalité et légitimité' et autres essays 
(Puiseaux: Editions Pardès, 1990), 242. 
30 C. Schmitt, “The Legal World Revolution”, Telos 72 (1987), 76. 
31 Ibid. 80 
32 Ibid.  
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a criminal instead of a political adversary, or an enemy of humanity, which is the worst kind 
of enmity. 33  
This critique of the political use of philosophies of history is a constant throughout 
Schmitt’s work. It is particularly present in some of his later texts, but also in his 1923 text 
on the crisis of parliamentarism, in which he formulates a strong critique of Lukács’ 
philosophy of history.34 Its messianism also discredits the enemy in advance and undermines 
the contingency of political decision. 
 
 
Historical singularity 
 
In his struggle around the concept of history, Schmitt attempts to formulate an alternative to 
the dominant philosophies of history which threaten to undermine the political. One 
possibility he discusses, is the return to the ‘new paganism’ of the theory of eternal return. 
This is not a real alternative for Schmitt, however, as it amounts to the renunciation of 
history altogether.35 It takes human beings back into nature again, while the essence of 
political existence is to transcend it. In nature, there is no politics: a relation can only become 
political when one can put the other spiritually into question.36  
Moreover, there is a more profound problem with the idea that there is repetition in 
history. Even when it does not figure within a philosophy of eternal return, it is politically 
problematic. Schmitt raises this issue within the framework of a discussion of the strategic 
                                                 
33 Theo De Wit, “Op zoek naar de vijand. De agressiviteit van de vooruitgang volgens C. Schmitt,” in A. 
Braeckman (ed.) Onbehagen met de moderniteit (Kapellen: Pelckmans, 2001), 117. 
34 C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). 
35 C. Schmitt, “L’unité du Monde (II)”, 246. 
36 C. Schmitt, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West. Bemerkungen zu 
Ernst Jüngers Schrift: ‘Der Gordische Knoten’,” in: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 533. 
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answers to the current era of space revolution. He observes a tendency to repeat the answers 
that were given to former transformations of the spatial order of the world. He analyzes for 
instance how the Versailles treaty resulted in an intermediate situation between war and 
peace, as it understood peace merely as the end to actual fighting. What was really at stake, 
however, was to found a new spatial order, as the old one had fallen apart, which the Great 
War had shown so painfully. For Schmitt, peace could not just consist of the end of the 
fighting, as it then would become mere non-war.37 Genuine peace required a new 
stabilisation of the global political relations.  
The Great War was fundamentally new in history, according to Schmitt, and so had 
to be its ending. “In the great history of humankind, each true peace is only true once. Peace 
which really brings an end to a war around spatial order can only a peace based on a new 
spatial order.”38 In this sense, one cannot repeat the old answers to the wars which took 
place within the former spatial order. The way peace is realised within a political 
configuration, is thus always historically specific. The protagonists of the Versailles Treaty 
were incapable of thinking the newness and singularity of the historical moment in which 
they acted.  
This notion of historical singularity reappears in several of Schmitt’s post world war 
II texts. It adds an important aspect to his thinking of the political. If history would indeed 
repeat itself, politics would degenerate in the mechanic application of pre-given answers, 
while what actually is at stake, is to think singular events and to act in conditions which 
never existed before. There cannot be a general theory of history which provides 
omnihistorical guidelines for political action. In several texts, Schmitt underlines that 
                                                 
37 C. Schmitt, “Die Raumrevolution. Durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen Frieden,” in: Staat, Grossraum, 
Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), 389. 
38 Ibid. 
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historical thinking is about unique situations and therefore about unique truths39: “The big 
events are unique, irrevocable and unrepeatable. A historical truth is true only once.”40  
According to Schmitt, this also implies that counterfactual reasoning makes no sense. 
It is mere fantasy to try to think what would have happened if Napoleon had won Waterloo, 
if the industrial revolution would have originated on the continent etcetera. Such an exercise 
undermines genuine historical thinking, which has to be focused on the real singular event. 
Schmitt calls such reasonings ‘absurdities, because they forget the uniqueness and 
unrepeatability of historical events.”41 
Schmitt recognises that man has “an almost irresistible need to eternalise his last 
great historical experience. Precisely my sense of history guards me from such repetitions. 
My sense of history especially maintains itself by recalling to memory the unrepeatable 
uniqueness of all great historical events. A historical truth is true only once. But also the 
historical call, the challenge which opens a new epoch, is true only once and is correct only 
once.”42 One is tempted to think history with the help of historical parallels, but these can 
only serve to sharpen the consciousness of the uniqueness of the historical event. If not, 
they turn into the basis of “a more general lawfulness, a functional sequence, which does not 
exist in history.”43  
 
Schmitt’s stress on historical singularity does not mean that history disappears altogether, as 
it is within the postmodern focus on the now, lacking historical roots. For Schmitt, one can 
think historically, and even try to grapple history theoretically, for instance, by theorising the 
                                                 
39 C. Schmitt, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West,” 531. 
40 C. Schmitt, Gespräch über die Macht und den Zugang zum Machthaber/Gespräch über den Neuen Raum (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1994), 55. 
41 C. Schmitt, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West,” 531. 
42 C. Schmitt, Gespräch über die Macht und den Zugang zum Machthaber/Gespräch über den Neuen Raum, 61. 
43 C. Schmitt, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West”, 531. 
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rise and demise of spatial orders or nomoi. Frederic Jameson underlines the striking parallel 
between Schmitt’s notion of the nomos and the Marxist concept of mode of production.44 
This last concept is an omnihistorical notion, which obtains its specific content through 
analysis of a concrete historical form of society, and which thus enables a very open 
theorisation of history.45 In a similar vein, in his post war work, Schmitt elaborates a general 
theory of how spatial orders or nomoi arise and perish, each nomos having its own historically 
specific way of functioning. The space revolutions in-between constitute singular historical 
moments or events.  
What is important is that Schmitt’s stress on difference and singularity in history is 
not based on epistemological considerations. His focus is on how historical meaning 
functions politically, and how it makes genuine political thinking and action possible. 
Schmitt’s insistence on the singularity of historical events implies a specific conception of 
political action, consisting of giving a “unique concrete answer to the call of a similarly 
unique concrete situation.”46 Schmitt calls this ‘call-answer’ structure of historical events 
‘dialectic’, and opposes it to the idea of polarity, which is present in historical visions 
focusing on the eternal return of the same. “Every historical action and act of a human being 
is the answer to a question which is raised by history (…). Every human word (Wort) is an 
answer (Antwort).”47 The meaning of the answer is drawn from its precedent question, and 
the meaning of this question lies in the concrete situation from which it arises.  
                                                 
44 Fredric Jameson, “Notes on the Nomos,” South Atlantic Quarterly 2 (2005), 202. Schmitt himself remarkably 
also refers to the “suprastructure”, as to what arises from what is “historically essential”, namely the choice for 
a maritime or a terrestrial existence (C. Schmitt, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes 
von Ost und West,” 539).  
45 Derek Sayer, The violence of abstraction. The analytic foundations of historical materialism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987), 31. 
46 Ibid. 532. 
47 Ibid. 
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In this sense, Schmitt’s approach radically dismisses the notion of history as a 
reservoir of ‘lessons’ for future generations. Reinhart Koselleck called this vision of history 
‘historia magistra vitae’, being based on repetitivity.48 He showed how this vision ran out of 
credibility with the advent of modernity. As Tocqueville already said for instance, one cannot 
compare the works of the revolution with anything that preceded it: “I go back from century 
to century until the earliest antiquity; I do not see anything which resembles what I face 
today. When the past no longer enlightens the future, the spirit marches in darkness.”49  
 
Schmitt’s arguments on the call of history resemble those of Colingwood, whom he 
considers to be too psychological and individualistic, and those of Toynbee, whose 
challenge-response structure tends to erase historical singularity and thus overlooks the 
character of the historical itself. Schmitt argues that Hegel’s dialectical vision had the 
potential to make this singularity reappear, although it immediately lost it again by 
formulating a speculatively systematic philosophy of history, in which historical singularity is 
subordinated to a greater historical plan.  
Schmitt’s stress on historical singularity against the idea of repetition in history is not 
enough to rescue the political character of history. Indeed, emphasising the unique character 
of historical events can perfectly go together with thinking history in terms of progress.50 
And as Walter Benjamin has argued, if there is one depoliticising vision of history which is at 
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the side of the victors, it is the ideology of progress. That is why Benjamin demands to brush 
history against the grain.51  
According to Schmitt the concept of progress is not only used by the victors of this 
era, but it has also become the ideology of the masses. Schmitt even speaks about a “religion 
of technicity”, characterised by the belief in progress and infinite perfectibility.52 It heads 
towards depoliticised world unity. This makes his outlook more pessimistic. Still, he clearly 
discards the ideology of progress in favour of a vision which can account for historical 
singularity more truthfully, by thinking it as an event:  
History is not the unfolding of natural-scientific, biological or other rules and norms. 
Its essential and specific content is the event, which arrives once and doesn’t repeat 
itself. Here, experiences do not count, neither do functionalisms, nor hypothetical 
proportions combined in order to see what would have happened when this or that 
fact would not have happened.53   
Schmitt’s objective is to think history in such a way as to avoid the pitfall of historical 
automatism or lawfulness. Consequently, his conception of history is strongly opposed to 
the positivistic tendency towards lawful generalisations which make history calculable, as in 
Auguste Comte. Marx, too, had tended to generalise his concretely determined experience of 
industrialisation and his correct understanding of it into a general necessity. 
Subordinating the historical moment to such generalisations is also what ideologies 
of progress tend to do. Although they might account for the uniqueness of the single 
moment, their rationalism nevertheless tends to destroy its singularity by putting it on a 
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rationalistically conceived ascending line of progress.54 Against this, Schmitt claims that 
history always prevails over such philosophies of history.55 Although Schmitt systematically 
understands philosophy of history in a specific way, namely as the Enlightenment 
philosophy with its claim to scientific monopoly, he nevertheless argues that this idea is even 
valid for the Christian vision of history.56  
Schmitt’s notion of historical singularity as event is a polemical weapon against ways 
of thinking which tend to undermine the political character of the public spirit or symbolic 
order. He tried to find a way to symbolise the historical present in such a way as to enable it 
to become political, i.e. making possible struggles between more or less equal political 
subjects which recognise each other as such, and which do not discredit or dehumanise each 
other in advance. Visions of history which introduce repetitivity in history or forecast a 
future utopia, tend to consider one of the antagonists as rightful in advance. The insistence 
on historical singularity thus becomes a symbolic devise to undermine the victors’ image of 
history. For Schmitt, the idea of historical repetition is the spontaneous historical image of 
the victors, who “will not easily understand that also their victory is only true once.”57 
Thinking historical singularity then opens the space for the enemy or the defeated, as it 
undermines the victor’s claim to eternal domination. Faced with the alternative between 
“eternal recurrence on the one side, uniqueness and unrepeatability of historical events and 
epochs on the other side,” Schmitt thus clearly opts for the second.58 At the same time, he 
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strongly dismisses utopian thinking as well, as this, too, tends to subordinate the historical 
present to a pre-given image of the future and thus to obfuscate the enemy.59  
With his stress on historical singularity, Schmitt opens the possibility for a radical 
historisation of political defeat, in which the victors of today can become the defeated of 
tomorrow. The notion of history as ‘judge’ thus becomes problematic. Moreover, this stress 
on historical singularity also opens a space of contingency, in which human beings have to 
answer the call of history in fundamentally new ways. This contingency is not absolute or 
total, as, for instance, Schmitt thinks only a limited number of options are available to 
answer the current need for space revolution. There is no historical source, however, which 
can decisively help to reduce this complexity of the current conjuncture. Schmitt’s approach 
thus tries to find a middle ground, opposed both to the dominant historical generalisations 
as to the demise of history altogether. This implies that the event is not ‘pure’ in the sense 
that it always appears within specific historical conditions, to which it can of course not be 
reduced. Thinking the political oscillates between the rejection of several kinds of 
philosophy of history and the maintenance of a profane, pluralised image of history which 
opens a space of contingency for strategic action.  
 
 
Pluralising history 
 
Throughout Schmitt’s work, several attempts to think real history without falling into the 
trap of philosophy of history are unevenly developed. They result in a view of history which 
is not a predestined, transparent and meaningful totality with its own immanent 
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development. On the contrary, it is a contingent process characterised by a full concept of 
time broken by multiple temporalities, as different social spheres can have their own 
rhythms, accelerations and discontinuities. Even the sphere of (political) ideas has its own 
temporality, according to which “there are epochs of great energy and times becalmed, times 
of motionless status quo.”60 The political will turn out to constitute an attempt to handle 
these multiple times, which require a thinking of crises, situated judgment and decision. 
The fact that historical time is not self-transparent, but characterised by non-
contemporaneity and desynchronisation, is most obvious in the inevitable anachronism of 
the spirit. All spirit is present spirit, states Schmitt, while he acknowledges at the same time 
that spirit is inevitably struggle and differentiation, non-identity. In his text on ‘The Age of 
Neutralisations and Depoliticisations’, Schmitt develops the idea that the past centuries were 
characterised by several shifts in what constituted the central domain of spiritual life. In the 
16th century, the theological was central, but this shifted respectively to the metaphysical in 
the 17th century, the humanitarian-moral in the 18th, and via an intermediate phase of the 
romantic-aesthetic to the economic and technical from the 19th century on. The motor force 
of this succession of stadia was the quest for a neutral sphere, “in which the struggle was 
brought to a close, and people settle their disputes, reach agreement and convince each 
other.”61 Schmitt explicitly states that this historical picture cannot be considered as a 
philosophy of history, but that it is merely an attempt to think the concrete history of 
concrete conflicts and their results a posteriori. The succession of ‘stages’ cannot be 
conceived as a line of progress nor of regress.62 What is at stake is a dialectic of elites which 
replace each other, not a philosophy of history as such.  
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Schmitt takes a peculiar position within this historical succession: in an epoch which is 
impregnated by technical thinking, he strongly defends the concept of sovereignty, which is 
totally at odds with this way of thinking. Schmitt’s philosophical position is an anachronistic 
intervention in contemporary spirit. How can Schmitt, in an era whose metaphysics, “the 
most intensive and the clearest expression of an epoch”, is pervaded by mechanical and 
technical thinking and in which the machine is considered to “run by itself”63, nevertheless 
escape from it and defend the political?64 Similarly, how is it possible that in the 19th century 
Donoso Cortés upheld “the theological mode of thought of the Middle Ages, whose 
construction was juristic?”65 Schmitt’s polemic against the dominant technical spirit in favor 
of genuinely political thought inevitably pluralises historical time. This temporal plurality was 
indeed constitutive of his analysis of depoliticisation:  
 Actually, it would also be a misunderstanding to explain the succession of stages in 
such a way as if in each century there would have been nothing else than the central 
sphere. There exists rather a pluralist co-ordination of different stages which are 
already traversed; people of the same time and the same country, yes even of the 
same family live next to each other in different stages, and contemporary Berlin for 
instance is closer in cultural respect to New York and Moskou as to München or 
Trier.66  
Different spheres, and even different social subjects, have different historical temporalities. 
People do not have to go through all the stages the European elite has passed through. 
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Actually, the masses leaped from one kind of magic spirit to another: from traditional 
religion to the mass religion of technological progress.  
This pluralisation of history and of social time is a recurrent theme in several of 
Schmitt’s texts: from his interbellum work in which he emphasises the different rhythms of 
law, the military and the economic to his distinction of the multiple forms of progress in his 
text on the ‘Legal World Revolution.’  
Schmitt thus opens up history as a process characterised by multiple possibilities. As 
already stated, its contingency is not total: not everything is equally possible. Even if it is 
open, history has a structure, which makes that not all ideologies or ways of thinking can be 
as effective in a definite epoch or conjuncture. Indeed, a certain spirit can be really outdated 
according to Schmitt. He states for instance that the metaphysics of parliament can no 
longer be valid in the era of the proletariat. With the rise of this new political subject, the 
intellectual principles of such old institutions become ineffective. Nevertheless, these 
institutions can outlive themselves, even when their ‘spirit’ no longer has any effectivity. 
That is part of the diagnosis Schmitt makes of parliamentarism in his book The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy. Schmitt states that monarchy becomes a merely external apparatus 
when the “sense of the principle of kingship, of honour, has been lost, if bourgeois kings 
appear who seek to prove their usefulness and utility instead of their devotion and 
honour.”67 One can certainly find new practical justifications for maintaining the monarchy, 
but other institutions might be better suited to realise these practical objectives:  
The same holds true of the ‘social-technical’ justifications for parliament. If 
parliament should change from an institution of evident truth into a simply practical-
technical means, then it only has to be shown via facta, through some kind of 
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experience, not even necessarily through an open, self-declared dictatorship, that 
things could be otherwise and parliament is then finished.68 
History thus has a certain materiality, and therefore, historical judgment remains possible for 
Schmitt, although from the moment it is expressed in the language of philosophy of history, 
it threatens to undermine the political. In the above example, however, Schmitt’s judgment 
remains entirely grounded on an analysis of the factual forces which are politically relevant in 
the current epoch, and of how they can be integrated to form a political unity. What is 
crucial is that it is not history which judges, but concretely situated political subjects, who, 
faced with a limited range of possibilities inscribed within their historical configuration and 
with a definite enemy, have to decide.  
The necessity and urgency to decide is increasing in the twentieth century under the 
influence of a number of events which constitute ruptures and continuities to which political 
adaptation becomes ever more difficult: “war and post war, mobilisation and demobilisation, 
revolution and dictatorship, inflation and deflation.”69 This has put the stabilising inertia of 
law under strain.70 As economy and war push forward, law cannot follow, resulting in vain 
and dangerous attempts to “motorise” law.71 
In a context of continual new developments, mere defense of the status quo 
becomes impossible.72 If one likes it or not, it is the time of events, ruptures and 
discontinuities which governs political action. This is the “full time” Benjamin spoke about, 
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and resembles a politicisation of the romantic time concept, which Schmitt described as 
follows: 
In every moment, time determines the human being and confines the most powerful 
human will. As a result, every moment becomes an overwhelming, irrational, 
ghostlike event. It is the ever-present and incessant negation of the countless 
possibilities that it destroys.73 
Schmitt has a sharp consciousness of modern time: its momentaneous, fluid, contingent, 
rapidly changing character is an important aspect of his thought74. His decisionism is a 
political-juridical answer to this full and pluralised time of modernity, which must be thought 
in terms of a discontinuous process of ruptures, moments of acceleration and of slowing 
down, of events. Every decision is an intervention in this multiplicity of times. It breaks the 
continuum of empty time: as Schmitt stated already in one of his early quasi-kantian works, 
there is a time of immediacy and one of mediation.75  
However, while the above quote on the romantic conception of time could also be 
interpreted as referring to the postmodern experience of the now, which lacks historical 
roots, Schmitt’s notion of broken time figures within a strategic political perspective, 
focusing on the range of possibilities which are inscribed in the moment of decision. In 
several texts, Schmitt refers to the realist adage that politics is the “art of the possible.”76 
This strategic conception is based on a very profane conception of time and history. 
Schmitt’s reference to the “call of history” should be interpreted similarly, as a way to 
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approach a concrete conjuncture in terms of its strategic (im)possibilities, between which 
one has to decide. It would be a mistake to hypostatise history into a ‘calling subject’. This 
would be at odds with Schmitt’s criticisms of historical-philosophical hyperpolitics. Strictly 
speaking, history ‘does’ nothing. If it would, it would render the political almost impossible. 
Because of his decisionism and its concomitant concept of time and history, Schmitt stands 
out amongst his fellow right-wing thinkers. He is no Hegelian dialectician, for whom the 
crisis is only a moment in the unfolding of contradictions towards higher syntheses. For 
Schmitt, not all contradictions can be rationally mediated, as Carlo Galli has shown.77 It is no 
coincidence that the notions of sovereignty and constituent power were so central to his 
approach, concepts which Hegel had refused.78 His deeply modern conception of time 
makes it impossible for him to find security, like Louis de Bonald did, in the slow flow of 
history.  
In this sense, Schmitt stands very far from the original understanding of 
conservatism, as for instance Panajotis Kondylis, who is greatly influenced by Schmitt, 
explained it in his book Konservativismus. The real sovereign, states Kondylis, is the demiurg of 
history (Geschichtsdemiurg).79 Sovereignty and historicity go hand in hand.80 Sovereign decisions 
show that “history is not a circle which is accomplished and brought to a close from the very 
beginning in the womb of the eternal order of being, but that it is an open and dynamic 
movement.” Kondylis understood conservatism as a vision which defended ‘societas civilis’, in 
which law is firmly anchored within a natural and divine order of being. The advent of the 
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notion of sovereignty is disrupts this order, laying the ground for a different conception of 
time.  
According to Schmitt, conservatism is no longer an option in modern society.81 
Already in his early work in the 1920s, he situated notions which were central to him, such as 
dictatorship, in the sphere of “revolutionary democratism.”82 He considered decisionism as a 
genuinely historical mode of thinking in law, as it enabled one to connect to a singular point 
in time, contrary to normativism and concrete order thinking.83  
 
 
Katechon 
 
As stated before, Schmitt’s struggle around historical meaning has a metapolitical stake : it is 
to ward off visions of history which inhibit a political self-understanding of the present. That 
is the reason why Schmitt cannot give a ‘scientific’ account of why the political appears at a 
certain moment in time. Trying to give for instance a sociological explanation of the 
appearance of friend/enemy antitheses, as a certain marxism attempted to do by 
sociologising the political, already endangers the political character of the symbolic order 
governing these antitheses. Politicisation cannot be seen to emerge from within a causal 
sequence, but must be understood as an event. For Schmitt, politicisation is always situated 
within real historical conditions, and in this sense his notion of the event differs from the 
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one of Badiou or Althusser for instance.84 But it inevitably entails a leap from these 
conditions onto the level of intensity typical of the political. Any other account of it 
threatens to shift the symbolic character of antagonism to a non-political level, be it of a 
moral, scientific or other nature. Formulating a theory which tries to give a scientific 
explanation for politicisation tends to reduce the political antagonism to an expression of a 
deeper causal logic, and this always threatens to shift the symbolic constitution of the 
antagonism to a de- or hyperpoliticised level.  
In this sense, thinking the political implies thinking rupture and continuity, history 
and the event, as a contradictory unity. Indeed, the event cannot be thought of as a new 
beginning ‘ex nihilo’. Paradoxically, within the Schmittian framework the political decision 
always somehow stands under the command of an outside which precedes it : the exception, 
or the enemy. For instance, the sovereign does not decide ‘out of the blue’, but always within 
a crisis-ridden conjuncture, when history imposes the necessity to decide upon the sovereign. 
To the event of the sovereign decision precedes the manifestation of something which can 
be interpreted as the exception. In this sense, the appearance of the political is not, as it is in 
Hannah Arendt, the beginning of something radically new, because there is always 
something preceding the political event. Political action for Schmitt is fundamentally 
(historically) situated, and must understand itself as such.85 That is why the political depends 
on the recognition of what precedes it, i.e. its historical situatedness and the plurality of 
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friends and enemies within which it appears. According to Schmitt, the attempt to realise a 
real ‘creatio ex nihilo’ degenerates into hyperpolitics, as it annihilates the enemy.86 
Schmitt refuses ‘natural-scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ accounts of the event of the 
political, but at the same time, he definitely feels the need to occupy a position within the 
field of struggle around historical meaning, against the images of the automaton or of 
progresss. He needs a meaning-giving element on the metapolitical level which is different 
from those accounts and which can nevertheless provide a more general historical image to 
underscore his sober contention that history is political. However true it might be, such a 
sober and profane vision cannot reach the polemic intensity required to successfully combat 
the opposite images of history.  
The hypothesis can be put forward that it is within this problematic that the 
enigmatic notion of the katechon acquires its sharp edge. Many authors have been puzzled 
about the seeming impossibility to find coherence in Schmitt’s use of this notion.87 What is 
crucial, however, is what Schmitt opposes to it. It then appears that the katechon is a force 
which has to ward off the possibility of a world without politics, be it in the form of 
cosmopolitan “world unity”, “total functionalisation” of law, “nihilistic centralisation” or 
“eschatological paralysis.”88 If one defines history in terms of political struggle, as Schmitt 
does, the end of history equals the end of politics.89 That is where the notion of the katechon 
appears : restraining the end of history is fighting against the demise of the political. The 
katechon provides a strong image of what Schmitt’s metapolitical endeavour is about : to 
save the political from de- and hyperpoliticisation. In this sense, one cannot reduce the 
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katechon to a force which merely maintains the current order or the state. It is a force which 
attempts to maintain the political character of the world in general. That is clear from the 
following passage, in which Schmitt connects the katechon to the notion of the people, 
which is the polemic counterpart to the notion of the state90, but which remains genuinely 
political : “The katechon, that is shortage, that is hunger, misery and powerlessness. It are 
those who do not govern, it is the people ; all the rest is mass and object of planning.”91 
In this sense, my hypothesis, which cannot be fully developed here, is that the notion 
of the katechon fills the hiatus in Schmitt’s metapolitical endeavour to fight and to account 
for the political nature of the world, as any ‘scientific’ or other explanation of this politicity 
tends to undermine it. Comparably to Derrida’s notion of “messianism without religion”, 
which denotes a profane, anti-utopian and politicising structure of historical experience, the 
katechon can thus be seen as a generic polemic and meaning-giving figure which is the key 
to a political conception of history, although it is more sober than Derrida’s messianicity.92  
Schmitt clearly understood that one cannot abstain from giving meaning to history, thus 
leaving this space open to the many conceptions which tend to undermine the political 
character of the symbolic order which they are always a constitutive part of. In this sense, 
the katechon seems to be the most minimal devise to give meaning to history which can be 
imagined. It is a figure which is drawn from theology, but which has to keep history open, 
plural, contingent and profane, or in other words, political. The utmost the katechon does, is 
to discard the sacralisation of history which results from certain images of history. It does 
this by keeping off divine interventions or their secularised counterparts in the real world of 
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politics, as these can only lead to a form of hyperpolitics, because they in one way or another 
predict an end to history. The figure of the katechon is the minimal condition to ward off 
the theologisation of historical meaning, be it of an open religious character or of a 
secularised version of it (as with ideologies of progress and humanity). It is the minimal 
precondition to keep history and theology apart, rescuing the political conception of history 
from eschatological hyperpolitisation.  
Moreover, it enables a historisation of defeats. That is something of which 
Tocqueville proved to be incapable, as he lacked the concept of a katechontic force, 
according to Schmitt. He thus became “a defeated, who accepts his defeat.”93 At stake here 
is how the defeated can live with their defeat and their place in history. Consciousness of 
‘katechonticity’ is what enables the defeated to relativise their defeat and maintain a 
consciousness of historical contingency and singularity. Such a vision provides the energy, 
albeit of a very weak kind, to politicise the defeat and to think of the strategic possibilities to 
overturn it. The katechon thus becomes a metapolitical weapon against the victors who try 
to eternalise their victory by depoliticising it. As it cherishes historicity, it preserves the 
politicity of the present.  
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